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I. Introduction
John Doe was beginning his senior year when his University
received three anonymous complaints filed against him by Janes
1, 2, and 3.1 Jane 1 described the night John offered to walk her
home from the bar. She was heavily intoxicated from a party, but
John followed her into her dorm room and proceeded to digitally
penetrate her. Jane 2 told the University of an evening where John
was touching, kissing, and trying to force himself on her despite
her extreme intoxication and visible discomfort. Jane 3 recounted
a night that John followed her into a bathroom and began touching
her and exposing himself to her until she ran away.
The University conducted an investigation into the complaints
and held three hearings. John claimed little memory of the
evenings, and the hearing panel found his testimony unpersuasive.
The University ultimately found John responsible for the sexual
misconduct and expelled him. In response, John sued his
University and its officials, claiming, among other things, that the
University proceedings were tainted with gender bias against him.
John explained that the federal government’s pressure on the
University to address sexual assault issues, combined with student
activism to raise awareness about campus sexual assault,
influenced his University to find him guilty—all because he is a
male and the victim of reverse gender discrimination.2
The conversation surrounding sexual discrimination, sexual
harassment, and sexual misconduct in general has undergone a

1. The following facts are based on the factual allegations in Doe v. Colgate
University, No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 4990629 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,
2017), which is further discussed infra Part IV.B.1.
2. While men and women can both be victims or perpetrators of sexual
assault, for the purposes of this Note and its discussion of reverse Title IX claims,
the plaintiff/accused will be referred to with masculine pronouns and the
victim/accuser will be referred to with feminine pronouns.
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drastic transformation over the past few years.3 The volume of
public discussion regarding sexual assault on college campuses, in
particular, has significantly increased in recent years.4 The federal
government,5 university students,6 and the public at large7 have
begun to put pressure on universities to change their policies
surrounding sexual assault allegations. Many universities have

3. A large portion of this conversation began in the employment setting,
with sexual harassment being brought to the forefront under the #MeToo
movement. For a discussion of the social movement and its effects on employment
discrimination law, see, for example, Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual
Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 17 (2018) (outlining ten principles within the sexual harassment arena
that need to be addressed in reform efforts); Joanna L. Grossman, The Aftermath
of the #MeToo Movement, JUSTIA (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/2KZF-445C
(last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (describing how the landscape has shifted
“seismically” because of the damage that a high-profile outing under the social
movement can have an on employer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
4. See, e.g., Bethany A. Corbin, Riding the Wave or Drowning?: An Analysis
of Gender Bias and Twombly/Iqbal in Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2676 (2017) (noting that “the dialogue surrounding sexual
assault on campuses has grown exponentially in recent years”); Aya Gruber, Rape
Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (2016) (stating that the “volume
of public discussion about rape . . . certainly is widespread, ever increasing and
affecting law and policy at a rapid rate”).
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of Title IX through
guidance from the federal government).
6. See Alexandra Brodsky, A Rising Tide: Learning About Fair
Disciplinary Process from Title IX, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 822, 822–23 (2017)
(“Student organizers, many of whom publicly identify as survivors, used a
combination of legal complaints, public protest, and powerful narratives to
pressure their schools—often successfully—to change their approach to sexual
violence reports.”); David DeMatteo, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: A
50-State Survey of Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and Their Relevance to
Campus Sexual Assault, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 227, 227 (2015) (stating that
“a recent series of highly publicized sexual assaults on college campuses involving
questionable responses by academic institutions has resulted in calls for change
from several groups” including victimized college students and their parents who
“have expressed outrage at the response of some academic institutions”).
7. See Libby Sander, Quiet No Longer, Rape Survivors Put Pressure on
Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/9RCY-3WJS
(last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (explaining that “hundreds of students and activists
nationwide have formed a movement to force colleges to change how they handle
reports of rape” because they are “angry with their colleges for turning a blind
eye to sexual violence and for failing to help prevent it”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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taken procedural and substantive efforts to address the issue of
campus sexual misconduct.8
Although there are vocal supporters of the policy changes,
there are also many who oppose such measures.9 Many
universities that have made efforts to improve and strengthen
their sexual assault disciplinary processes have faced backlash for
such measures.10 Some opponents view the campus disciplinary
process as unfair to the accused students.11 Another criticism of
8. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and
Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1980–81 (2016) (highlighting that over
1,000 colleges and universities now use affirmative consent rules for sexual
misconduct and that these standards “enhance sexual autonomy” and “mirror the
history of progressive attempts to reform rape law”); Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and
Procedural Fairness: Why Disciplined Student Litigation Does Not Undermine the
Role of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault, 78 MONT. L. REV. 71, 71 (2017) (“The
increase in both enforcement and public attention has motivated colleges and
universities to improve their policies and practices for addressing sexual assault,
including their disciplinary processes.”).
9. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 4, at 2713 (stating that “the erosion of legal
rights” by the federal government guidance on Title IX issues “is fundamentally
problematic”); Joe Dryden, Title IX Violations Arising from Title IX
Investigations: The Snake is Eating its Own Tail, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641 (2017)
(“The motivation for this paper arose out of a concern for the rights of the accused
in sexual assault investigations, and a disbelief in the statistics being used to
justify additional governmental intrusion into the operation of public and private
colleges and universities.”).
10. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 825 (“Many Title IX opponents deploy a
rhetoric of ‘overcorrection’ and a pendulum swinging too far, as though a single
axis of justice exists on which every gain for one side is a loss for the other.”);
Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 634 (2018)
(“One paramount concern has been that in the resultant rush to protect victims
and comply with [Office of Civil Rights (OCR)]’s new policies, schools did not
adequately protect the accused students’ procedural due process rights.”); Tyra
Singleton, Note, Conflicting Definitions of Sexual Assault and Consent: The
Ramifications of Title IX Male Gender Discrimination Claims Against College
Campuses, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 155, 172 (2017) (“It is not a rare occurrence
that institutions, relying on state funding and private endowments, will be
swayed by public opinion as it makes controversial decisions.”)
11. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 831 (“Many critics have painted recent
survivor-protective efforts by the Department of Education, tasked with enforcing
Title IX, as an attack on accused students’ rights.”); Corbin, supra note 4, at 2715
(“Accused assailants frequently endure skewed investigatory and adjudicatory
processes that lack basic truth-seeking structures.”); Diane L. Rosenfeld,
Uncomfortable Conversations: Confronting the Reality of Target Rape on Campus,
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 359, 369 (2015) (“Critics argue that alleged instances of
sexual assault are often mere miscommunications, in which an alleged
perpetrator believes that consent has been given when in fact it has not.”).
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the university disciplinary model generally is that the issues
should not be handled administratively but rather processed
through the criminal justice system.12 These critics often
emphasize the seriousness of the allegations being made against
accused students.13 Opponents also defend accused students using
rhetoric such as the “he had such a bright future” argument in
order to highlight the negative consequences for those being found
responsible under the campus disciplinary system.14
Students accused of sexual harassment or assault have
increasingly begun to sue their colleges and universities in order
to seek redress for alleged unfairness during their university’s
disciplinary proceedings.15 The accused students pursue many
theories of liability, including breach of contract,16 denial of
12. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1994 (stating that “[d]espite a long and
continued history of bias against victims of sexual assault, oft-repeated
arguments by opponents of Title IX tend to idealize the criminal law and
disparage the campus disciplinary system” as “ill equipped to handle complaints,”
unlike “the criminal justice system where real justice resides”); DeMatteo, supra
note 6, at 227 (explaining that there has been “significant debate regarding how
much the criminal justice system can and should be involved when sexual
assaults occur on college campuses”); Dryden, supra note 9, at 677 (arguing that
guilt or innocence “should not be determined by the media, or by the court of
public opinion, or by potentially biased school administrators who are trying to
avoid negative publicity and the ire of the OCR” but rather “should be
administered in front of an impartial tribunal”). But see Brodsky, supra note 6, at
829–30 (“In many critics’ misguided judgment, the obvious solution to school
disciplinary failures is to cede all authority to police.”).
13. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 841 (“[C]ritics bemoan the failure
of campus ‘rape trials’ to live up to the standards of actual criminal rape
trials—thus styling Title IX’s protections for victims as fundamentally at odds
with expected protections for the accused . . . .”); Singleton, supra note 10, at 156
(“[F]inding an accused student responsible for sexual misconduct carries a
seriousness within both a university judicial system and larger society. An
accused student’s good name, reputation, honor, integrity, and liberty are at
stake.”).
14. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1992–93 (“The sympathy many express
for those accused of sexual assault in campus proceedings, which have extremely
limited consequences relative to the criminal justice system, contrasts sharply
with the disdain society has expressed for sex offenders outside of the campus
setting.”).
15. See infra notes 16–87 and accompanying text (highlighting examples of
claims against universities and the theories of liability students have pursued).
16. See, e.g., Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 220 (D. Mass. 2017)
(finding that a male student expelled for violating his private college’s sexual
misconduct policy alleged sufficient bases for his breach of contract claim because
the fact-finding process was not impartial and fair, as promised in the school’s
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constitutional due process rights,17 breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing,18 defamation,19 estoppel,20 tortious
interference,21 and more.22 Students have also pursued claims
policies and procedures); Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799,
807– 08 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (stating that a university could be held liable for a breach
of contract claim when it did not train investigators and hearing panel members
as outlined in its disciplinary procedure policies).
17. See, e.g., Gischel v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 302 F. Supp. 3d 961, 978–79
(S.D. Ohio 2018) (concluding that a student had presented plausible allegations
that the university had violated his procedural due process rights by not allowing
him to mount a meaningful defense against the sexual assault claim); Tanyi v.
Appalachian State Univ., No. 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853, at *7
(W.D.N.C. July 22, 2015) (stating that the university official made a decision
against the student that could be considered arbitrary or motivated by bad faith,
allowing the student’s substantive due process claim to proceed); see also J. Brad
Reich, When Is Due Process Due?: Title IX, “The State,” and Public College and
University Sexual Violence Procedures, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 19–27 (2017)
(discussing why due process protections are necessary during public university
Title IX disputes to protect the presumed innocence of alleged offenders).
18. See Amherst, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 220 (finding that a jury could reasonably
conclude that the college denied the student a fair adjudication of the complaint
against him, thereby breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
19. See Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 749–50 (S.D. Ohio 2014)
(allowing a male student’s libel claims against his university to survive a motion
to dismiss because the university’s statements regarding his expulsion marked
him as a person expelled for a serious violation).
20. See Doe v. Case W. Reserve Univ., No. 1:17-CV-414, 2017 WL 3840418,
at *13 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017) (determining that the university’s unambiguous
representations and promises to not deny the student his procedural rights and
to provide support to anyone involved could reasonably be relied on to the
student’s detriment).
21. See Collick v. William Paterson Univ., No. 16-471 (KM) (JBC), 2016 WL
6824374, at *21 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2016) (explaining that the university’s
statements against two male students could constitute tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage by severing their relationships with the
Educational Opportunity Fund Program that provided them with loans).
22. See Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 994–95 (D. Minn.
2017) (explaining that a negligence claim against a university can survive
because universities could owe students a duty of care under their special
relationships to conduct the sexual assault proceedings in a non-negligent
manner); Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-CV-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at
*24 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012) (allowing a student’s claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress to survive a motion to dismiss because he had sufficiently
alleged that officials acted intentionally, maliciously, or recklessly and that the
student suffered severe emotional distress); Doe v. Univ. of the S., No. 4:09-CV-62,
2011 WL 1258104, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2011) (allowing a student to
proceed with a quasi-contractual claim that his university was unjustly enriched
under its policies regarding sexual assault).
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against their universities alleging reverse gender discrimination
under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act.23
Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program . . . .”24 Title IX was originally enacted because “Congress
wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual citizens
effective protection against those practices.”25 Students who have
experienced sexual harassment26 or sexual assault27 in the
educational context may take action under Title IX.28 Additionally,
students accused of sexual harassment or assault have brought
claims against universities under reverse Title IX theories.29 This
Note examines if, and to what degree, courts should consider the
pressure put on universities to address sexual misconduct on
campus as support for an accused student’s Title IX claim of gender
discrimination during university disciplinary proceedings.
This Note begins in Part II by discussing the prevalence of
campus sexual assault and the ways in which Title IX is used to
address it on university campuses. Part III examines reverse Title
IX claims by accused students, including the various causes of
action and the pleading standards required. Part III also surveys
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
24. Id.
25. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
26. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (determining
that unwelcome sexual advances constitute sex discrimination if they render a
workplace hostile to the members of a sex).
27. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that sexual
abuse and assault “obviously qualify as . . . severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive sexual harassment”).
28. See, e.g., Sander, supra note 7 (“Meant to prohibit sex discrimination at
institutions that receive federal funds, the law requires colleges to investigate and
resolve reports of sexual misconduct, including assault . . . .”). For a discussion of
the effect of sexual violence in other educational settings, see Emma Brown,
Sexual Violence Isn’t Just a College Problem. It Happens in K-12 Schools, Too.,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/3MY2-BKHU (last visited Nov. 11,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See infra Part III; see also Corbin, supra note 4, at 2714 (“The climate of
Title IX sexual assault litigation is changing. Previously viewed as a victim
protections statute, Title IX is increasingly being invoked by accused perpetrators
of sexual violence to demand fair and equitable disciplinary proceedings.”).
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the success of reverse Title IX claims using public pressure on
universities to address sexual assault to support their allegations
of gender discrimination. Part IV then evaluates the way summary
judgment rules and burden-shifting frameworks affect the
likelihood of success for reverse Title IX claims. Finally, Part V
emphasizes the need for clarity and consistency in the evaluation
of reverse Title IX claims. In considering the purposes and policies
of Title IX, this Note ultimately argues that reverse Title IX claims,
especially those relying on external pressure on universities,
should be assessed in a strict and limited manner going forward.
This Note concludes in Part VI by discussing the possibilities of
proposed changes to federal regulations and their impact on
reverse Title IX claims.
II. Overview of Campus Sexual Assault
A. Campus Sexual Assault
In the modern climate,30 there is a great deal of tension on
college campuses regarding rape culture and sexual assault.31
College campus conversations relating to sexual assault are
30. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 1969 (“An increasing awareness of the
widespread nature of campus sexual assault facilitated legal change at the state
and federal level to address it. No matter to which study one refers, campus sexual
assault is a large problem.”); Gruber, supra note 4, at 279–83 (discussing the
“post-millennial sex war” and stating that “the claim that rape is a widespread
and worsening problem that affects all women and reflects deep gender inequality
is no longer just a feminist mantra, but an increasingly accepted, uncontroversial,
and even undebatable claim”); Diane Heckman, The Proliferation of Title IX
Collegiate Mishandling Cases Involving Sexual Misconduct Between 2016–2018:
The March to the Federal Circuit Courts, 358 ED. L. REP. 697, 698 (2018)
(asserting that the nomination of Justice Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court
“acutely put sexual misconduct on the national landscape, with the televised
hearings, radio, and press coverage”).
31. See DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 227 (“A recent series of highly publicized
campus sexual assaults and the questionable responses by the academic
institutions where they occurred has led some policymakers and academic
administrators to call for legislative and institutional change.”); Laura L. Dunn,
Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Ensuring Compliance with the
Clery Act, Title IX and VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 564 (2014) (“Unlike
ever before, there is national pressure on colleges and universities to address
campus sexual violence.”).
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currently quite polarized, impassioned, and controversial.32
Despite the fact that both sides of the argument appear to be rooted
in a value for students’ access to education, the debate instead
focuses on the consequences for either the accused or the accuser
in sexual assault situations.33
Evidence shows that campus sexual assault is a serious
problem.34 Even with the significant data that exists regarding the
prevalence of sexual assault and harassment on college
campuses,35 the statistics likely understate the actual
pervasiveness due, at least in part, to underreporting by victims.36
Common reasons for the low reporting of sexual assault incidents37
32. See, e.g., Annaleigh E. Curtis, Due Process Demands as Propaganda: The
Rhetoric of Title IX Opposition, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 273, 278–81 (2017)
(outlining how rape culture is a “social phenomenon” that can give rise to
“propagandistic speech”); Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 359 (“The longstanding
epidemic of campus sexual assault has finally reached a flashpoint, igniting a
national dialogue.”).
33. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 827–28 (discussing the shared values
between the two “warring interests” based on the shared “unifying principle”
centering around “the need to combat unjust deprivations of the right to learn,
whether the threat is unaddressed gender violence or, less frequently, false
accusations”). Despite Brodsky’s belief that shared values unite both sides of the
argument, she also refers to the national discussion as “the ill-informed circus of
debate on Title IX” and “a wrongheaded and counterproductive battle.” Id. at 848.
34. See Dunn, supra note 31, at 565 (“While murder rarely occurs on college
and university campuses, sexual violence is endemic.”).
35. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault:
An Empirical Examination, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015) (evaluating not
only the data reported by universities regarding campus sexual assault but also
the discrepancy between rates reported before and after an audit and theorizing
that universities undercount incidents of sexual assault).
36. See, e.g., DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 228 (stating that “[e]ven more
striking than the published statistics on the prevalence of college sexual assaults
is the likelihood that these reported statistics significantly underestimate the
actual prevalence of campus sexual assaults due to remarkably low levels of
incident reporting”); Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 367 (“Roughly one-third of
students who experience unwanted sex do not report the incident to anyone,
including friends or family. No more than 10% report their experiences to a school
official.”) (emphasis in original).
37. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 367 (citing the reasons for not reporting
as including “fear of not being believed or taken seriously, not knowing it was
sexual assault, not wanting others to know about the experience, belief that
nothing will be done, insufficient proof, and fear of retaliation from the offender
or his friends”); Grayson Sang Walker, Note, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX
Doctrine on Peer Sexual Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 98 (2010) (“Filing
a formal complaint with school officials often triggers a lengthy and embarrassing
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include wariness regarding the school’s investigatory and
adjudicatory processes, lack of awareness about the definition and
classification of sexual assault, the victim’s fear of retaliation, and
lack of punishment given to perpetrators.38 If colleges and
universities are to truly “effectively address campus sexual
violence,” they “must develop progressive campus policies to
contend with these realities.”39 Recent university reform under
Title IX has sought to do just that.
B. Title IX and Federal Guidance
Traditionally, most of the focus of Title IX enforcement has
been aimed at addressing gender discrimination by providing
female athletes in university sports with equal opportunities.40 In
2011, the Department of Education (DOE) and the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) published a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL),41 which
adjusted the goals of Title IX. The 2011 DCL drew attention to sex
discrimination on college campuses outside of the athletic context
and shifted the focus of Title IX enforcement toward addressing
issues of campus sexual assault.42 The Trump administration has
investigation, even if the case is never referred to a local prosecutor. Survivors
naturally fear a loss of privacy and control during this process . . . .”).
38. See Brodsky, supra note 29, at 2678–79 (discussing the mindsets of
sexual violence survivors including the victims’ discouragement regarding the
“lax punishment afforded to perpetrators by university officials”). For a discussion
of the “range of penalties associated with administrative adjudication of campus
sexual assault cases” and the reluctance of schools to expel sexual assault
perpetrators, see DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 230.
39. See Dunn, supra note 31, at 565–66 (explaining that the “silent epidemic”
which “masks the reality of perpetration on campus” stems from the inability to
identify sexual assault, the fear of social stigma, the self-blame, and the hesitancy
to label the perpetrator as a rapist).
40. See Walker, supra note 37, at 99 (explaining that “Title IX is best known
for its role in expanding women’s sports at the high school and collegiate levels”);
Corey Rayburn Yung, Is Relying on Title IX a Mistake?, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 891,
902 (2016) (“Traditionally, Title IX litigation and regulation has been focused on
addressing unlawful disparities in athletic departments and sex discrimination
in hierarchal relationships.”).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://perma.cc/5B4C-GAM2 (PDF) [hereinafter 2011 DCL].
42. See Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s Unrealized
Capacity to Prevent Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2015)
(stating that the 2011 DCL, in particular, has “shifted the equality conception of
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abandoned many of the requirements and protections reinforced
under the 2011 DCL.43 New policies will likely be enforced by
Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos and could have a significant
impact on all forms of Title IX claims, which is discussed later in
this Note.44 However, these changes do not impact this Note’s
discussion of cases referencing “federal pressure,”45 which refers
generally to federal guidance before the proposed changes,
specifically the 2011 DCL and direction under the Obama
Administration.46
The 2011 DCL begins by discussing the requirements and
responsibilities of schools to address sexual misconduct and
“concludes by discussing the proactive efforts schools can take to
prevent sexual harassment and violence.”47 The letter indicates
that compliance with Title IX requires “publishing a notice of
nondiscrimination, designating an employee to coordinate Title IX
compliance, and adopting and publishing grievance procedures.”48
These measures “serve as preventive measures against
Title IX” to “one aimed at rape and other sexual assault on college campuses”
which has “accelerated exponentially” the “pace of the discussion of sexual assault
on college campuses”); see also Walker, supra note 37, at 99 (“The focus on sports
has limited the transformative power of Title IX’s non-discrimination
mandate . . . Title IX was intended to protect all students, not just female
athletes, from gender discrimination in federally funded educational programs
and activities.”) (emphasis in original).
43. For a general description of the Department of Education’s new policy
and guidance under the Trump administration, including withdrawal of the 2011
DCL, see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dep’t of Educ. Issues New Interim
Guidance
on
Campus
Sexual
Misconduct
(Sept.
22,
2017),
https://perma.cc/C24Y-4V2P (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [hereinafter 2017 Press
Release] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. See infra Part VI.
45. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1065 (“Both fueled by the public
discussion of campus sexual assault and also fueling the discussion, the DOE is a
significant player in raising the profile of this issue in the past several years.”).
46. See Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL
4990629, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017) (stating that the “2017 DCL does not
impact the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Title IX claim” because updated
interpretation “simply demonstrates that OCR can ‘from time to time change its
interpretation’ of a statute” and does not mean that the University’s compliance
with the 2011 guidelines violated Title IX (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984))).
47. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 2 (providing examples of ways that
schools can “end such conduct, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects”).
48. Id. at 5.
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harassment” and “bring potentially problematic conduct to the
school’s attention before it becomes serious enough to create a
hostile environment.”49 While universities are threatened with loss
of federal funding for failure to comply with Title IX requirements,
Title IX also provides universities with a mechanism to more
proactively address campus sexual assault.50
Sexual violence is an extreme example of sexual harassment,
which is a subset of the sexual discrimination forbidden under
Title IX.51 According to the 2011 DCL, “[a] number of different acts
fall into the category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual
assault, sexual battery and sexual coercion,” all of which “are
forms of sexual harassment covered under Title IX.”52 Sexual
harassment consists of any “unwelcome conduct of a sexual
nature,” which also includes “unwelcome sexual advances, request
for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct
of a sexual nature.”53 To be actionable under Title IX, the sexual
discrimination must have a connection to the complainant’s ability
to access her education54 because “Title IX guarantees protections
49. Id. at 5–6.
50. See Mann, supra note 10, at 6333 (stating that Title IX serves as a
starting place for addressing sexual assault complaints because, “[a]s is typical
for a civil rights statute, Title IX codifies the societal interest in protecting victims
against certain types of discrimination and requires schools to provide an equal
access to education”); see also Brodsky, supra note 6, at 823 (“Decades after an
appellate court first held that the sex discrimination law Title IX requires schools
to address allegations of sexual harassment, many colleges undertook serious
reform efforts, recognizing the legal and reputational threat of their own
noncompliance with civil rights law for the first time.” (referencing Alexander v.
Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 181–83 (2d Cir. 1980))). But see Yung, supra note 40, at
893 (arguing that “it is a mistake to solely or primarily depend on Title IX to deter
and punish offenders in university sexual assault cases” because of the
“uncertainty related to various aspects of Title IX doctrine and the regulatory
regime that has emerged to enforce the statute”).
51. See Yung, supra note 40, at 895 (providing a chart explaining the
subcategories but clarifying that “[d]espite the assumption that sexual assault is
a subset of sexual harassment, there are numerous differences between
university sexual assault cases and the more typical sexual harassment claims
brought under Title IX”).
52. 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 1–2.
53. Id. at 3.
54. See Mann, supra note 10, at 641–42 (“There are many ways in which the
two can be tied; examples include claims of being unable to attend class or engage
in shared activities (such as the dining hall) for fear of encountering the accused
student.”). For a further explanation of the connection between sexual assault,
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to student survivors of gender violence because such violence
creates an unconscionable sex-based obstacle to the pursuit of an
education.”55
A significant development from the 2011 DCL came from the
ways in which it “strengthened the rights and protections for
victims of sexual misconduct and affirmed the university’s
proactive obligations to eliminate sexual violence.”56 On the other
hand, the shift toward sexual violence victim protection was
accompanied by an increase in perpetrator victim mentality, which
further contributes to the polarized debate on college campuses.57
Although the 2011 DCL is not binding law or rulemaking,58 the
federal government threatened to investigate and withhold federal
funding from universities who did not comply, putting significant
pressure on universities to address sexual assault.59 Many
students and scholars claim that this public pressure on
universities makes them inevitably unfair places for adjudication
of the issues.60 Some scholars view balancing the rights of the
sexual harassment, and sex discrimination, see Yung, supra note 40, at 895–98
(explaining that “[m]any of the shortcomings related to Title IX’s application to
peer-to-peer sexual assault cases arise because the statute, by its own terms,
must confront such cases as a form of sexual harassment which, in turn, is a form
of sex discrimination”).
55. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 828.
56. Corbin, supra note 4, at 2676.
57. See Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 85 (theorizing that the trend of cases
involving disciplined students after the 2011 DCL is explained “by increased
reporting of sexual assault and the corresponding increase in the number of
students disciplined” due to universities’ altered disciplinary practices).
58. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1064 (explaining that while each of the
OCR’s Dear Colleague Letters “carries less formal weight than regulations or
Guidance, colleges and universities respond to them wisely as expressions of
OCR’s intentions in conducting investigations of colleges for compliance with Title
IX”); see also Brodsky, supra note 6, at 823 (explaining that “counternarrative[s]
emerged from some law professors, reporters, libertarians critical of the
administrative state, and those skeptical of the existence of campus rape: that
schools, in their attempts to conform to the Department of Education’s
nonbinding recommendations, were now violating the rights of students accused
of gender violence”).
59. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1065 (“The DOE is signaling its active
use of administrative enforcement of Title IX to address peer assault since the
2011 Dear Colleague [L]etter, and colleges are scrambling to react. . . . Colleges
feel greatly increased pressure to do what the DOE is requiring . . . .”).
60. See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 10, at 155 (“[M]any colleges and
universities, in an effort to comply, went outside the scope of what Title IX
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accused with the rights of the complainant as an impossible
situation for universities to balance.61 Either way, universities are
open to civil liability under Title IX,62 especially if their established
grievance procedures and disciplinary processes are not strictly
followed.
C. University Disciplinary Processes
Generally, student victims who experience sexual assault
have a few options, including pursuing criminal and civil cases
against the perpetrators.63 Additionally, students have the option
to seek relief through their educational institutions.
Educational institutions provide remedies that are unique to
the educational setting,64 and the educational forum can have

required and developed procedures that are overwhelmingly stacked against the
accused and infringe on the accused’s constitutional rights.”). Compare Stephen
Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 80–83 (2013) (arguing that
universities should not handle sexual assault claims because of their inevitable
bias stemming from public pressure to punish sexual misconduct more
aggressively), with Brodsky, supra note 6, at 825 (“[I]n the narrower college rape
context, many advocates and most popular accounts tell a tale of warring
interests. Schools can either prevent and respond to gender violence or protect
accused students’ rights; these aims are imagined to be entirely mutually
exclusive.”).
61. But see Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived Catch-22: Providing
Fairness to Both the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault
Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 277, 293 (2009) (stating that neither
due process nor Title IX “creates a ‘Catch 22’ for colleges and universities” because
“each provides procedural safeguards that are congruent with the other, and thus
schools do not have to choose between the rights of the accused student or the
rights of the student complainant”).
62. See Yung, supra note 40, at 902 (“Because the university might be sued
in either case, likely under Title IX in both situations, it is in a situation ripe with
potential conflicts of interest. A litigation-averse university will likely pursue the
course least likely to create civil liability.”).
63. See Mann, supra note 10, at 639 (describing the avenues and remedies
available to sexual assault student victims, including “contacting the police to see
if a criminal case could be pursued, filing a civil tort case, filing a civil restraining
order, and/or pursuing actions at the student’s educational institution”).
64. See Walker, supra note 37, at 98–99 (“Universities possess a wide range
of remedial powers, including orders of protection, suspension, and expulsion.”).
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many advantages65 over the criminal66 and civil67 fora. Campus
disciplinary proceedings can “provide survivors with access to
justice and remove threats to the student body” without requiring
formal court proceedings.68 However, “nothing prevents the dual
adjudication of campus sexual assaults,”69 and student victims
may pursue an administrative remedy through university
proceedings while also seeking redress through the court system.
The required characteristics of university Title IX disciplinary
proceedings changed significantly with the 2011 DCL and are
continuously undergoing further change under the Trump
Administration.70 The 2011 DCL provided significant guidance as
to adequate grievance procedures and “devotes, conservatively
counted, fifteen of the nineteen pages to how a college should
respond to a sexual assault.”71 First, Title IX compliance requires
notice to students and employees of the grievance procedures,
including the appropriate place to file complaints.72 Next, schools
65. See Mann, supra note 10, at 640
Student victims often turn first to their educational institution for
remedies because this is the most effective and direct way they can get
what they need to continue their education. [They] often prefer to see
remedies from their community directly, rather than proceeding
through the civil or criminal process . . . .
66. See id. at 639 (describing how officers rather than victims are in charge
of criminal cases and that the “punishment would not necessarily assist the
student victim with remaining at school pending the outcome of the criminal
case”).
67. See id. at 640 (acknowledging that civil cases are often lengthy and
“courts are often reluctant to issue stay-away orders that affect the accused
student’s ability to attend class, as they view this as interfering with the
educational institution’s sphere of authority”).
68. See Walker, supra note 37, at 99 (noting that campus proceedings do not
necessitate the participation of law enforcement authorities and require a lower
burden of proof than a criminal trial).
69. See DeMatteo, supra note 6, at 230 (“Simultaneously pursuing remedies
through the academic institution and criminal justice system would provide
victims with a range of options in seeking redress for the offense.”).
70. See infra Part VI (outlining the impact of the 2017 DCL and DeVos’s
proposed regulation).
71. See Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1066 (explaining the DCL includes
“guidance on training employees to recognize and report a sexual assault that has
occurred; the duties of a Title IX coordinator to oversee complaints of sexual
assault; and the requirements of an adequate grievance procedure for addressing
complaints of sexual assault”).
72. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 9 (recommending that the grievance
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are required to provide “equitable grievance procedures,” which
are “adequate, reliable and impartial” and generally include
“conduct[ing] investigations and hearings to determine whether
sexual harassment or violence occurred.”73 Traditionally under
Title IX, once the educational institution has actual or constructive
notice of potential sexual discrimination, the statute obligates the
school to act in response.74
The 2011 DCL indicated that “preponderance of the evidence
is the appropriate standard for investigating allegations of sexual
harassment or violence.”75 The letter also states that Title IX
requires that a school allow both parties an equal opportunity to
present relevant witnesses and other evidence at the investigation
and hearing and give both parties “similar and timely access to any
information that will be used at the hearing.”76 OCR indicated that
it would regulate whether the schools’ grievance procedures specify
reasonably prompt time frames within which the procedures will
take place.77 The 2011 DCL makes clear that “[w]hen OCR finds
that a school has not taken prompt and effective steps to respond
to sexual harassment or violence, [it] will seek appropriate
procedures “be prominently posted on school Web sites; sent electronically to all
members of the school community; available at various locations throughout the
school or campus; and summarized in or attached to major publications issued by
the school”).
73. Id. at 9–10.
74. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2677 (“When a university knows or
reasonably should know of an incident of sexual violence, it must take action to
eliminate the harassing environment.”); Silbaugh, supra note 42, at 1066 (“Any
fair reading of the [2011] DCL leads to the conclusion that its primary goal is to
communicate to colleges and universities how they must conduct their discipline
or grievance processes after learning of a possible sexual assault in order to
remain in compliance with Title IX.”). This rule was enforced under the 2011
DCL. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 4. However, the proposed regulations under
the current administration seek to eliminate the “reasonably should know”
requirement.
75. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 11 (stating that school procedures which
currently use the “clear and convincing standard” are inconsistent with the
standard of proof used in civil rights violations, making them inequitable under
Title IX).
76. Id.
77. See id. (“Based on OCR experience, a typical investigation takes
approximately 60 calendar days following receipt of the complaint. Whether OCR
considers complaint resolutions to be timely, however, will vary depending on the
complexity of the investigation and the severity and extent of the harassment.”).
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remedies for both the complainant and the broader student
population,” which could include withdrawal of federal funding by
the DOE or referral to the U.S. Department of Justice for
litigation.78 Notably, the 2011 DCL explicitly states that “schools
should ensure that steps taken to accord due process rights to the
alleged perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title
IX protections for the complainant,” seemingly emphasizing
complainant discrimination protections over the procedural rights
of the accused.79
D. Title IX and Due Process
In general, the 2011 DCL Title IX guidance provides “more
robust procedural protections for both parties than does the
Constitution—or any other federal law or regulation.”80 While the
Constitution applies only to public schools that function as an arm
of the state, Title IX applies to any school receiving federal
funding. The Constitution provides some procedural due process
rights to students at public universities, but “students at private
schools have no procedural due-process rights; the fairness of their
schools’ disciplinary processes is a matter of contract, and
disciplinarians need only conform to their written policies.”81 In
this way, Title IX as applied to gender violence presents “a more
robust vision of fair process on campus than does the
Constitution.”82 It broadens the scope of protection because it
extends “for the first time in federal law a basic fair-process
mandate to all private universities that receive any federal
assistance, not just those public schools subject to constitutional
due-process requirements.”83

78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 831.
81. Id. But see Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 101 (“Though the Constitution’s Due
Process Clause does not bind private colleges, courts have in many cases insisted
that private universities have an obligation not to treat students unfairly or with
malice,” which “is sometimes rooted in the contract doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing.”).
82. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 832.
83. Id. at 836.
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While due process discussions are often intertwined with Title
IX procedural violations, due process claims individually against a
university are typically more successful than Title IX claims.84 Due
process claims “can survive motions to dismiss, and even win
outright, without the unnecessary step of linking procedural error
to gender bias.”85 The claims also sometimes avoid the negative
backlash that results from a reverse Title IX claim —“because
universities’ due process obligations do not conflict with those
under Title IX, litigation on due process grounds can hold
universities accountable for procedural fairness without
weakening the university’s sexual assault response or exposing the
university to a risk of liability under Title IX.”86 Because many
Title IX theories can be supported by evidence of procedural flaws,
due process violations are often discussed in relation to Title IX
violations. However, it is important to remember that the two
claims are distinct from one another.
III. Stating a Reverse Title IX Claim
Many courts recognize a cause of action under Title IX for a
student accused of sexual assault against a university for
discrimination in disciplinary proceedings if it appears the
student’s gender influenced the disciplinary action.87 These claims
84. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2712–13 (noting that “the current pleading
climate suggests that due process and breach of contract actions . . . are easier to
plead and thus more likely to proceed to discovery”); Yung, supra note 40, at 897
(stating that Title IX requirements can be difficult for plaintiffs to meet because
“[i]f a plaintiff does not show clear evidence of a decline in academic performance
due directly to sexual victimization or denial of university services, Title IX might
not apply”).
85. Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 101.
86. Id.
87. See Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57–59 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing
a cause of action if the university discipline is motivated by the student’s gender);
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714–16 (2d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging a cause
of action and dividing the claims into two categories based on erroneous outcome
and selective enforcement); Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 589– 87
(E.D. Va. 2018) (stating that a cause of action could arise from a university’s
disciplinary proceedings if the university demonstrated gender bias against an
accused male student); Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL
4532243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2017) (recognizing that a male student accused
of sexual harassment and stalking, whose gender was a motivating factor for the
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have drawn on many aspects of the disciplinary process as
evidence of discrimination88 and had varied success at different
stages of litigation.89 Title IX is enforceable through an implied
private right of action,90 the remedy being monetary damages91 or
injunctive relief.92
A recent trend in these claims is that students will use the
public pressure put on universities as evidence that the university
was biased against them.93 It is not always clear if this strategy is
based in “political outrage,”94 but the claims often do serve
university’s deciding to discipline, had a cause of action); Doe v. Case W. Reserve
Univ., No. 1:17-CV-414, 2017 WL 3840418, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017) (stating
that a private cause of action exists because a university is not allowed to
implement discipline if gender is a motivating factor behind the decision); Doe v.
Lynn Univ., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (recognizing a cause
of action that could be divided into selective enforcement and erroneous outcome
challenges); Ritter v. Okla. City Univ., No. CIV-16-0438-HE, 2016 WL 3982554,
at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 22, 2016) (allowing a cause of action for a male student
claiming gender discrimination in his university’s disciplinary action); Doe v.
Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (D.R.I. 2016) (recognizing a cause of action
if gender is a motivating factor behind a university’s disciplinary action).
88. See, e.g., infra notes 105–109 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018)
(evaluating an erroneous outcome challenge to university disciplinary
proceedings on a motion for summary judgment by the University); Doe v. George
Washington Univ., 305 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133–34 (D.D.C. 2018) (evaluating an
accused student’s claim at the preliminary injunction stage and concluding he did
not sufficiently demonstrate a likelihood to succeed on the merits); Rolph v.
Hobart & William Smith Colls., 271 F. Supp. 3d 386, 399–404 (W.D.N.Y. 2017)
(evaluating the plaintiff’s Title IX claims at a motion to dismiss and deciding that
the plaintiff had stated a claim under erroneous outcome, but not under selective
enforcement).
90. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (“Not only the
words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter and underlying purposes,
counsel implication of a cause of action in favor of private victims of
discrimination.”).
91. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)
(concluding that “a damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce
Title IX”).
92. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 247 (2009)
(explaining that Title IX allows for a plaintiff to seek the full range of remedies,
including injunctive relief (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76)).
93. See infra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
94. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2712–13 (“The driving force behind reverse
Title IX actions is the desire to proclaim political outrage at the extent to which
OCR has manipulated the educational disciplinary framework . . . . Because OCR
failed to equally protect male students, alleged perpetrators have no choice but to
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(whether intentionally or unintentionally) a political agenda aimed
at protections for the accused.95
A. Causes of Action
Most courts have explicitly recognized at least four Title IX
theories of liability under which a student may attack his
university’s disciplinary proceedings on the basis of gender bias
against him96: (1) erroneous outcome;97 (2) selective enforcement;98
(3) deliberate indifference;99 and (4) archaic assumptions.100
Occasionally
a
plaintiff
will
bring
claims
under

seek judicial relief.”). Corbin also blames the universities for the need for such
claims, stating that “the closure of justice’s doors during the university
disciplinary process has forced accused students to seek vindication of their rights
in courts of law.” Id. at 2685.
95. See Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 107
[D]iscplined-student plaintiffs’ emphasis on Title IX claims
contributes, perhaps by design, to anti-feminist backlash. Because
Title IX’s application to sexual assault is destabilizing to those who
participate in and benefit from the cultural association of masculinity
with power that stems from rape, it may be the case that some
disciplined-student plaintiffs find particular satisfaction in attacking
the university with the same weapon that resulted in their expulsion
in the first place. They may seek to impeach Title IX in the political
arena by arguing that the statute is inherently contradictory and
biased in favor of one sex.
96. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589–95 (6th Cir. 2018) (evaluating
a student’s Title IX claims against his university under erroneous outcome,
selective enforcement, and deliberate indifference theories, as well as a
hostile-environment theory); Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 3:16-CV-4882-BRM-DEA,
2018 WL 466225, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2018) (evaluating the plaintiff’s claim
under the four theories of liability even though the Third Circuit had not
previously analyzed a Title IX claim arising from university disciplinary
proceedings); Stenzel v. Peterson, No. CV 17-580 (JRT/LIB), 2017 WL 4081897,
at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2017) (explaining that Title IX claims arising out of
university disciplinary hearings can be analyzed under the four theories of
liability and deciding to evaluate plaintiff’s claim under the selective enforcement
standard).
97. See infra notes 104–112 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
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hostile-environment101 and retaliatory action102 theories also. In all
of these Title IX claims, “a plaintiff must allege facts he was
discriminated against because of sex.”103
Erroneous outcome challenges to university proceedings are
the most common claims brought, as well as the most successful
thus far. Under erroneous outcome challenges, plaintiffs assert
that they were “innocent and wrongly found to have committed an
offense.”104 An erroneous outcome challenge to university
disciplinary proceedings requires a plaintiff to plead facts
sufficient (1) to cast doubt on the accuracy of the proceeding
against him105 and (2) to establish a causal connection between
gender bias and the flawed outcome of the proceedings.106 The
allegations vary from internal procedural flaws107 to error by
individual investigators108 to external pressure upon the
university.109 Once doubt has been cast, the plaintiff must allege
that the erroneous outcome was caused by gender bias against
him.110 The plaintiff must present “a particularized allegation
101. See infra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
103. Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL 4532243, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 10, 2017) (citing Winter v. Pa. St. Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 776 (M.D.
Pa. 2016)) (emphasis in original).
104. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
105. See id. (explaining that the articulable doubt must exist from the record
that was in front of the disciplinary tribunal at the time).
106. See id. (noting that the “[a]llegations of a causal connection in the case
of university disciplinary cases can be of the kind that are found in the familiar
setting of Title VII cases”).
107. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 592–94 (6th Cir. 2018)
(determining that unresolved inconsistency in the female complainant’s
statements and an erroneous definition of consent, taken with statistical evidence
showing a “potential pattern of gender-based decision-making” and pressure on
the University to combat sexual assault on campus, were sufficient to support
reasonable inference of gender discrimination under erroneous outcome).
108. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (stating that “some allegations, such as
statements reflecting bias by members of the tribunal, may suffice both to cast
doubt on the accuracy of the disciplinary adjudication and to relate the error to
gender bias”).
109. See Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
(holding that the nationwide pressure on universities along with the University’s
representatives’ awareness of the criticism of the University’s handling of
complaints was enough to support “the plausible inference of a causal connection
between the flawed outcome and gender bias”).
110. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (explaining that “allegations of a procedurally
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relating to a causal connection between the flawed outcome and
gender bias.”111 The allegations must “go well beyond the surmises
of the plaintiff as to what was in the minds of others and involve
provable events that in the aggregate would allow a trier of fact to
find that gender affected the outcome of the disciplinary
proceeding.”112
A selective enforcement claim under Title IX “asserts that,
regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the severity of the
penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected
by the student’s gender.”113 To successfully bring a selective
enforcement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
similarly-situated member of the opposite sex was treated more
favorably under the disciplinary proceedings due to gender.114
These claims often prove difficult for male plaintiffs due to the lack
of similarly-situated female perpetrators.115 Under a selective
enforcement claim, a plaintiff must at least “demonstrate an
inconsistency that warrants further inquiry.”116
Under the theory of deliberate indifference, “educational
institutions may be held liable for their deliberate indifference to
or otherwise flawed proceeding that has led to an adverse and erroneous outcome
combined with a conclusory allegation of gender discrimination is not sufficient”
unless there are “particular circumstances relating to a causal connection
between the flawed outcome and gender bias” alleged).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 716.
113. Id. at 715.
114. See Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1067–68 (S.D. Ohio
2017) (concluding that because the plaintiff could not identify a similarly-situated
female accused of violating the University’s code of conduct and not being
dismissed from the University, he had not sufficiently pled a claim for selective
enforcement).
115. See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 958–59 (N.D.
Ill. 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim because of his
conclusory statements and “especially in light of [his] allegation that ‘virtually all’
sexual assault complaints were lodged by females against males, which suggests
that [the University] has not had the opportunity to refuse to discipline female
students because of sexual assault”); Prasad v. Cornell Univ., 2016 WL 3212079,
at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (stating that the plaintiff “seemingly negates the
possibility of establishing that female students were treated more favorably than
males in similar circumstances” by alleging that the University had no reported
incidents of male students submitting sexual assault or misconduct complaints
against female students).
116. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
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acts of peer sexual harassment where their lack of response to the
harassment is “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.”117 To maintain a claim for deliberate indifference
under Title IX and be able to hold a university responsible for
sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a university
official had actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, the
misconduct.118 A failure to follow Title IX regulations is not alone
sufficient to allege sexual harassment under a deliberate
indifference claim.119 A claim for deliberate indifference was
designed for students alleging sexual harassment, which goes well
beyond sexual discrimination under Title IX disciplinary
proceedings—the
behavior
must
constitute
pervasive
harassment.120
Occasionally plaintiffs attempt to use an archaic-assumptions
theory under Title IX, alleging that the university acted based on
outdated, biased beliefs of gender dynamics.121 Plaintiffs assert
that universities maintain a perception of women as victims and
men as aggressors and therefore have an archaic assumption
based in gender bias.122 Courts have refused thus far to apply the
117. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
118. See Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 692–93 (6th
Cir. 2000) (concluding that the relief under Title IX was only available when the
policy is facially neutral if an intentional violation is shown, which requires actual
notice of the harassment and deliberate indifference to it).
119. See Z.J. v. Vanderbilt Univ., 355 F. Supp. 3d 646, 675 (M.D. Tenn. 2018)
(stating that the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim failed because the
allegedly biased disciplinary process was not sufficient to support “pervasive and
widespread harassment” that was actionable under Title IX (referencing
Carmichael v. Galbraith, 574 F. App’x 286, 289–90 (5th Cir. 2014))).
120. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]hough sexual
harassment is a form of discrimination for purposes of Title IX, we have held that
to plead a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, ‘the misconduct alleged must be
sexual harassment,’ not just a biased disciplinary process.” (quoting Doe v. Miami
Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 591 (6th Cir. 2018))).
121. See id. at 587–88 (explaining that the archaic-assumptions theory has
been used to “show that a school denied a student an equal opportunity to
participate in an athletic program because of historical assumptions about boys’
and girls’ physical capabilities” (citing Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 F. App’x 643,
638–39 (6th Cir. 2003))).
122. See Mallory, 76 Fed. App’x at 640 (describing the plaintiff’s
archaic-assumptions allegations that the University held an attitude that “men
cannot be violated,” which led to an assumption that the woman was the victim
in this situation).
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theory outside of the athletics context to a reverse Title IX claim
arising out of sexual assault disciplinary proceedings.123
Courts also have refused to apply the hostile-environment
theory to reverse Title IX cases arising out of disciplinary
proceedings. Under hostile-environment claims, plaintiffs allege
that their educational experiences were severely altered by their
universities’ discriminatory environments.124 Because the
hostile-environment theory is based on sexual harassment rather
than discrimination, plaintiffs must present “sex-specific language
or conduct designed to humiliate, ridicule, intimidate, or insult,”
which is typically more severe than the experience allegedly
caused by discrimination in disciplinary proceedings.125
Finally, a plaintiff can attempt to bring a reverse Title IX
claim if he believes his university pursued action against him in a
retaliatory manner.126 Under a claim of retaliatory action, the
plaintiff must demonstrate the university’s, or university official’s,
differential treatment of a complaint that the plaintiff in good faith
believes to be gender-based harassment.127 Therefore, the male
plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been sexually harassed by
123. See Baum, 903 F.3d at 588 (refusing the plaintiff’s request to extend the
theory because that court had never applied it outside of the athletic context and
did not see a reason to change course); Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409,
2017 WL 4532243, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2017) (stating that the standard applies
“only in cases alleging that a public school entity has denied equal opportunities
to participate in athletic programs based on unfounded and antiquated historical
notions about the physical capabilities of girls and boys” (citing Doe v. Baum, 227
F. Supp. 3d 784, 821 (E.D. Mich. 2017))).
124. See Vanderbilt, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 674 (“To sustain this claim, a plaintiff
must allege, among other things, that his educational experience was ‘permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of the victim’s educational
environment.’” (quoting Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2018))).
125. Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 765 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting
Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 107 F. Supp. 3d 481, 487–90 (D. Md. 2015)).
126. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2005)
(“Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex
discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by
Title IX’s private cause of action. Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act.
It is a form of ‘discrimination’ because the complainant is being subjected to
differential treatment.” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018))).
127. See id. at 174 (concluding that when a university “retaliates against a
person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional
‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX”) (emphasis in
original).
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the action brought against him, which is factually different from
most claims brought under reverse Title IX theories.128
B. Pleading Standards and Motions to Dismiss
The first hurdle for a plaintiff is to sufficiently state his claim
against the defendant and survive the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion129 in a reverse Title
IX claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that create a plausible
inference that the university engaged in sexual discrimination
against him.130 The plaintiff’s complaint must contain enough
factual content to allow the court to reasonably infer that the
plaintiff would be entitled to relief if he proved everything in his
complaint.131 There is significant case law exploring the pleading
standards and causality requirements under Title IX claims.132
Courts have reacted differently to the plausibility and
pleading standards used in relation to Title IX reverse
discrimination claims.133 One area in which courts differ is in their
willingness to accept allegations that public criticism and outside
pressure on universities demonstrate gender bias in the accused
128. See Salisbury, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70 (noting that the plaintiff’s
complaint regarding the minor discipline he received was “exactly the kind of
petty slight or minor annoyance that does not constitute an adverse act” under
retaliatory action).
129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (setting forth that a party may assert the
defense that the pleading party has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can
be granted”).
130. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2688–89 (evaluating the different judicial
responses to reverse Title IX lawsuits under Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz).
131. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (stating that while
legal conclusions and naked assertions are not sufficient, the court may determine
that facts taken as true and inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief).
132. See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56–59 (2d Cir. 2016)
(permitting an action to proceed against the University when the evaluator of the
claim formed a conclusion against the weight of the evidence, which substantially
favored the plaintiff/accused); Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x 437, 452 (6th Cir.
2016) (stating that the plaintiff had failed to create a reasonable inference that
gender bias was the cause of the allegedly deficient proceedings against him).
133. See Corbin, supra note 4, at 2697–2702 (explaining that the majority of
courts improperly dismiss reverse Title IX claims while a minority of courts
permit the claims to proceed to the discovery phase).
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students’ disciplinary proceedings.134 Some courts view these
allegations as gender neutral or at most showing a bias favoring
assault victims rather than favoring female students over male
students.135 Other courts have determined that the external
pressure on universities can give rise to a plausible explanation for
gender bias.136 The legitimacy of the causal connection between the
pressure upon the school and the alleged erroneous outcome or
selective enforcement is not consistent across the courts and
warrants further exploration and clarification.137
134. See, e.g., Ruff v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1289,
1296–97 (D.N.M. 2017) (stating that male college students failed to allege facts
demonstrating that outside pressure actually influenced the University’s pursuit
of the sexual assault case in a gender-biased manner rather than because of the
serious nature of the female student’s allegations); Rolph v. Hobart & William
Smith Colls., 271 F. Supp. 3d 386, 396–405 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating that the male
student’s criminal charge of a sex crime did not negate the inference of the
College’s gender bias, which the student plausibly pled stemmed from media
criticism of the College causing it to take a stance disadvantaging the plaintiff as
compared to the female complainant).
135. See, e.g., Doe v. Coll. of Wooster, 243 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886 (N.D. Ohio
2017) (determining that public criticism of the College did not suggest an
adequate basis for gender bias and that the fact that the College was seeking to
comply with federal regulation was not an indication of gender bias); Doe v. Univ.
of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1078 (D. Colo. 2017) (“[P]ressure from the
federal government to investigate sexual assault allegations more
aggressively–either general pressure exerted by the Dear Colleague Letter or
specific pressure exerted by an investigation directed at the University, or
both—says nothing about the University’s alleged desire to find men responsible
because they are men.”).
136. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that all
of the public attention and federal pressure alone is not enough to state a claim
but rather “provides a backdrop that, when combined with other circumstantial
evidence of bias in Doe’s specific proceeding, gives rise to a plausible claim”); Doe
v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018) (addressing allegations that
“pressure from the government to combat vigorously sexual assault on college
campuses and the severe potential punishment—loss of all federal funds—if it
failed to comply, led Miami University to discriminate against men in its
sexual-assault adjudication process”).
137. Compare Baum, 903 F.3d at 589 (Gilman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that the majority ruled in plaintiff’s favor despite his
failure “to show how general pressure on the University’s administration to
pursue and effectively address sexual-assault complaints” led the school to “take
actions against him based on gender bias), with Columbia, 831 F.3d at 57
(allowing plaintiff’s claim to proceed because it was “entirely plausible that the
University’s decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the
accusing female over the accused male, so as to protect themselves and the
University from accusations that they had failed to protect female students from
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1. Yusuf Baseline Standard
Yusuf v. Vassar138 was one of the first reverse Title IX claims
to reach the appellate level and clearly establish a standard for
pleading a reverse Title IX sex discrimination claim.139 The Second
Circuit stated that facts linking alleged procedural failures to
underlying gender bias are necessary because “[a]llegations of a
procedurally or otherwise flawed proceeding that has led to an
adverse and erroneous outcome combined with a conclusory
allegation of gender discrimination is not sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.”140 The court determined that causation
sufficient to state a claim for Title IX discrimination can be shown
by “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal,
statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of
decision-making that also tend to show the influence of gender.”141
The court ruled that the male student’s allegations regarding the
circumstances around his disciplinary proceedings demonstrated
events that could “sufficiently put into question the correctness of
the outcome of that proceeding.”142 The court determined that
these facts taken with the allegations that male students were
historically, systematically, and invariably found guilty
established a causal connection that gender bias affected the
outcome of his discipline.143

sexual assault”).
138. 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).
139. See id. at 712–13 (discussing the male student’s claim against his private
college alleging that his hearing was unfair when the College would not allow two
of his witnesses to testify).
140. Id. at 715.
141. See id. at 715–16 (“The allegations in support of the Title IX claim do
more than merely recite the pleader’s conclusion that the complained-of conduct
was discriminatory. Instead, the complaint alleges events that, if proven, would
support an inference of discrimination.”).
142. Id. at 716.
143. See id. (“The allegation that males invariably lose when charged with
sexual harassment at Vassar provides a verifiable causal connection similar to
the use of statistical evidence in an employment case.”).
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2. Yusuf Applied at Motions to Dismiss

In Doe v. Columbia University,144 the Second Circuit again
examined a reverse Title IX claim against a university.145 The
plaintiff alleged that criticism directed at the University for its
poor handling of female students’ sexual assault complaints
against male students146 and the fact that the University was
cognizant of that criticism caused the University to act upon
impermissible bias.147 The court stated that there was “nothing
implausible or unreasonable about the Complaint’s suggested
inference that the panel adopted a biased stance in favor of the
accusing female and against the defending male varsity athlete in
order to avoid further fanning the criticisms that Columbia turned
a blind eye to such assaults.”148 The court concentrated on the
individual investigator’s background149 and her significant
influence over the proceedings against the plaintiff.150 The court
144. 31 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016).
145. See id. at 53 (alleging that the University’s investigator was motivated
by pro-female sex bias, attributable in part to a desire to refute criticisms of
herself and of the University for their past handling of similar complaints,
causing her to conduct “a sex-biased and deficient investigation that was hostile
to his claim”).
146. See id. at 50–51 (explaining the criticism of the University among the
students and student organizations as well as in the press for its previous
leniency toward sexual assault allegations). For an example of some of the
criticism of Columbia at the time, see Tara Palmeri, Columbia Drops Ball on Jock
‘Rapist’ Probe: Students, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2013, 6:43 AM),
https://perma.cc/EJ2B-Y4WK (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (quoting female
students as saying “their cases are just one example of the school’s mishandling
of sex complaints” and “demanding that Columbia release more information about
its in-house probes on sex assaults”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
147. See Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 56 (describing the plaintiff’s allegations
“that Columbia’s hearing panel (which erroneously imposed discipline on the
Plaintiff), its Dean (who rejected his appeal), and its Title IX investigator (who
influenced the panel and the Dean by her report and recommendation), were all
motivated in those actions by pro-female, anti-male bias”).
148. Id. at 58.
149. See id. (explaining that the investigator “had suffered personal criticism
in the student body for her role in prior cases in which the University was seen
as not taking seriously the complaints of female students”).
150. See id. (illustrating that although she “was not the decision-maker, she
allegedly had significant influence, perhaps even determinative influence, over
the University’s decision”).
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then concluded that the male student had stated a plausible claim
that the decision was motivated by a “pro-female, anti-male bias,”
which caused the University to reach an incorrect conclusion.151
In Doe v. University of Chicago,152 an Illinois federal court
evaluated a male student’s claim that his University discriminated
against him because of his gender153 and encouraged
discriminatory retaliatory action against him.154 While the court
recognized as plausible the student’s allegation that the
University’s administration had encouraged his accuser to file a
retaliatory action against him because of gender bias,155 it did not
accept his allegations that the University’s overall climate was
biased against him or deliberately indifferent to sex-based
harassment directed at him.156 Significantly, the court also noted,
[T]he parties should bear in mind that the facts sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss may not be enough at a later stage
of the case, especially after discovery. The Court expects that
more specific details . . . will emerge in discovery. At this point,
however the Court is not deciding whether John Doe is likely to
win, only whether he has a story that holds together.157

While many reverse Title IX claims are beginning to survive
motions to dismiss, including when using public pressure as
151. See id. at 57 (stating that “it is entirely plausible that the University’s
decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the accusing female
over the accused male, so as to protect themselves and the University from
accusations that they had failed to protect female students from sexual assault”).
152. No. 16-C-08298, 2017 WL 4163960 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017).
153. See id. at *4 (“John Doe’s gender discrimination claim boils down to a
contention that he was treated adversely in the Title IX disciplinary process
because he is male, and that Jane Doe, a female student, was treated better
because she was female.”).
154. See id. at *9 (agreeing that the University official’s alleged conduct was
“so inexplicable that there is room for a retaliatory inference in John Doe’s favor
to explain” the official’s behavior).
155. See id. at *5 (“If [the investigator] intentionally encouraged Jane Doe to
file a false complaint—that is, he knew or believed that her complaint was false
and encouraged her to file it anyway—then it is plausible that [he] did so based
on gender bias.”).
156. See id. at *7 (explaining that the female student’s actions, including a
public accusation against the plaintiff and Title IX complaint accusing him of
sexual misconduct, even if false, were not harassment because of sex and,
therefore, could not be considered actionable sexual harassment (citing Mary M.
v. N. Lawrence Cmty. Sch. Corp., 131 F.3d 1220, 1228 (7th Cir. 1997))).
157. Id. at *6 (citing Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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evidence of discriminatory intent, the Chicago court correctly
acknowledged that the facts sufficient at this stage will likely not
be enough to survive later stages of litigation. Therefore, reverse
Title IX plaintiffs must be prepared to demonstrate specific details
regarding the sexual discrimination against them.
IV. Reverse Title IX and Summary Judgment
Once a plaintiff’s claim survives a motion to dismiss, the cases
often move to the discovery stage158 or the parties reach a
settlement.159 Once past these stages, the university will likely
next ask the court for a grant of summary judgment.160
A. Summary Judgment Burdens and Burden Shifting
A court may grant summary judgment if the moving party
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that
must be decided by a fact-finder, so that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.161 A party asserting that
there is no genuine dispute must support the assertion by showing
that the non-moving party cannot produce any admissible evidence
to support the facts necessary to its claim.162 To successfully oppose
a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party bears the
burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of fact exists as to
158. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (explaining that discovery
can “comprise between 50 percent and 90 percent of total litigation costs” in a
case).
159. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
160. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (opining that the
rules of evidence “mandate[] the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case”).
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247 (1986) (explaining that a material fact is any specific fact that might affect
the lawsuit’s outcome under the relevant law).
162. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (explaining that the party should inform “the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identify[] those portions of ‘the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact”).
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an essential element of the case.163 The party opposing summary
judgment must do “more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to material facts.”164 The court at this stage
should review all evidence in the record and “draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” but the court “may not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”165
In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,166 the Supreme
Court evaluated a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964167 in
which an employment applicant alleged that he had been unfairly
rejected based on his race for a position for which he was
qualified.168 The Court addressed the “notable lack of harmony”
that existed regarding the “applicable rules as to burden of proof
and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case” of
employment discrimination under Title VII.169 In describing the
complainant’s initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in a Title VII trial, the Court explained,
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.170

The Court determined that once the plaintiff has established
the prima facie case, the “burden then must shift to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
163. See id. at 321–22 (stating that to oppose a motion for summary judgment,
the non-moving party cannot rest on mere allegations).
164. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986).
165. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
166. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
167. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
168. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (stating that the plaintiff
respondent charged that he was denied employment because of his race and his
involvement in civil rights activities, which was supported by the fact that
petitioner “sought mechanics, respondent’s trade, and continued to do so after
respondent’s rejection” despite acknowledging his past satisfactory work
performance).
169. Id. at 801.
170. Id. at 802.
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employee’s rejection.”171 If the defendant employer succeeds in
demonstrating a reason, the plaintiff is given the opportunity to
show that the reason is actually pretextual in nature, meant to
disguise racial discrimination.172 The Court also elaborated on
certain evidence that would be relevant to a showing of pretext,
such as statistics regarding the employer’s general discrimination
against African American employees and evidence that white
employees involved in similar acts were treated more favorably by
the employer.173
The McDonnell Douglas framework allows plaintiffs alleging
discrimination a temporary presumption of the defendant’s
discriminatory motive in order to avoid the obstacle of only being
able to produce circumstantial, conclusory evidence.174 Since the
Supreme Court’s decision in 1973, courts have applied the
McDonnell
Douglas
framework
in
various
analogous
discrimination situations,175 including Title IX cases.176 The
171. Id.
172. See id. at 805 (ruling that the plaintiff respondent “must be given a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision”).
173. See id. at 804 (stating that the employer “may justifiably refuse to rehire
one who was engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this
criterion is applied alike to members of all race”).
174. See Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that
“until the defendant furnishes a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action
it took against the plaintiff, the plaintiff needs to present only minimal evidence
supporting an inference of discrimination in order to prevail”).
175. See, e.g., Janczak v. Tulsa Winch, Inc., 621 Fed. App’x 528, 534–35 (10th
Cir. 2015) (applying the burden shifting framework when an employee was
terminated while on Family and Medical Leave Act leave and determining the
employee sufficiently made out a prima facie retaliation claim but the employer
demonstrated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action); Moore v. City
of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1993) (allowing plaintiff to create a
presumption of racially discriminatory intent when employer disciplined him
more severely than other employees who engaged in similar conduct but were not
members of his protected class); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230,
239 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to an allegedly
discriminatory discharge of an employee by requiring the plaintiff to meet the
initial burden of demonstrating that the employee hired someone else to do the
same work despite the fact that he performed at the level of the employer’s
expectations).
176. See Columbia, 831 F.3d at 55–56 (“Yusuf made clear that Title VII cases
provide the proper framework for analyzing Title IX discrimination claims. We
therefore hold that the temporary presumption afforded to plaintiffs in
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framework serves as a tool for plaintiffs who can typically only
point to circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.
B. Cases Reaching Summary Judgment
Not many reverse Title IX cases have reached or passed the
summary judgment stage.177 The majority of these cases are either
dismissed for failure to state a claim or subsequently settled after
the court denies a motion to dismiss and allows the claim to move
to discovery.178 However, a few circuit courts and several district
courts have heard reverse Title IX claims on motions for summary
judgment and have consistently ruled against the accused
plaintiffs in favor of the universities.
1. First Circuit
Recently, the First Circuit reviewed a trial court’s decision to
grant summary judgment of Title IX claims against Boston
College.179 The court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendants on the plaintiffs’ Title IX claims under erroneous
outcome.180 The parties agreed that the applicable standard for the
employment discrimination cases under Title VII applies to sex discrimination
plaintiffs under Title IX as well.”); see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy
of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that in some respects, “a
Title IX sex discrimination claim requires the same kind of proof required in a
Title VII sex discrimination claim” (citing Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630 n.3
(2d Cir. 1997))).
177. See Buzuvis, supra note 8, at 91–93 (stating that “there are far fewer
summary judgment decisions evaluating plaintiffs’ evidentiary support for
erroneous outcome claims than opinions deciding motions to dismiss claims for
insufficient pleading” and that “no selective enforcement claims have yet survived
motions for summary judgment”).
178. See id. at 85–86 (explaining that “many university defendants have
prevailed on motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for insufficient pleading,
though courts have permitted disciplined-student plaintiffs’ Title IX claims to
proceed to the discovery phase” which positions the student in a good position to
procure a settlement from the university (referencing Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F.
Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2014))).
179. Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018).
180. See id. at 90–93 (explaining the plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim
but focusing on the erroneous outcome standard because the deliberate
indifference claim relied on the underlying acts of discrimination under the
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erroneous outcome claim required the plaintiffs “offer evidence
‘cast[ing] some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of
the proceeding,’ and indicating that ‘gender bias was a motivating
factor.’”181 The plaintiffs argued that the record contained
“sufficient evidence to support their erroneous outcome claim that
[the college]’s procedures were infected with gender bias.”182 They
contended that the college’s “pervasive belief” that perpetrators
are always male and accusers always female was evidenced in its
written policies and procedures.183 The plaintiffs also maintained
that the disciplinary proceedings were impacted by gender bias
arising from outside pressure against the college and evidenced by
a “pattern of decision-making” motivated by gender bias against
the accused plaintiff.184
The First Circuit determined that the plaintiffs failed on the
second Yusuf prong—that gender was a motivating factor in the
accuracy of the outcome—by only putting forth “superficial
assertions of discrimination.”185 In ruling against the plaintiffs, the
court emphasized that “[c]onclusory allegations are not enough” to
survive a motion for summary judgment186 and determined that
the plaintiffs’ argument that the college’s “administrators were
influenced by outside pressure, in particular the U.S. Department
of Education’s April 2011 ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter” was “both
conclusory and meritless.”187 Accordingly, the court ruled that the
erroneous outcome claim (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (per curiam))).
181. Id. at 90 (quoting Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994)).
182. Id. at 90–91.
183. See id. (describing the plaintiffs’ allegations that the College’s bias was
“confirmed by the terminology [it] employs in its written policies and procedures:
accusers are branded ‘victims’ or ‘victims/survivors,’ while an accused student is
labeled a ‘perpetrator’”).
184. See id. at 91 (noting that the plaintiffs cited several occurrences of college
administrators’ treatment of the accused, as well as the fact that the criminal
charges against him were dismissed, evidencing his supposed innocence).
185. Id. at 91–92.
186. Id. at 92.
187. See id. (“The Does have not explained how the Dear Colleague Letter
reflects or espouses gender bias. This necessarily dooms their argument that the
Letter somehow infected the proceedings at issue here with gender bias. More
than ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation’ is required to defeat summary judgment.” (citing LeBlanc v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1993))).
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plaintiffs did not meet the standard for challenging the college’s
sexual assault disciplinary procedures.188
In 2017, a federal district court in New York evaluated a
reverse Title IX claim against Colgate University.189 The plaintiff
in Colgate had been accused by three females of similar incidents
of sexual misconduct.190 After he was expelled from the University,
he brought an erroneous outcome challenge,191 alleging that his
expulsion was based on gender bias against him.192 The court
addressed each of the plaintiff’s arguments individually and
concluded that he failed to provide “sufficient evidence that gender
bias motivated Colgate’s decision to expel him.”193
The plaintiff alleged that the panel’s training was
gender-biased, the panel itself suffered from bias, the investigation
was biased because the investigator once worked at a sheriff’s
office, and the hearing was procedurally unfair.194 The plaintiff
also cited the University’s “sexual climate,” including student
activism and federal influence,195 at the time of the incident as
evidence of the pressure “that caused Plaintiff’s proceeding to be
tainted by gender bias.”196 The court compared the plaintiff’s
assertions to those in Columbia, but explained that the parties had
“reached the summary judgment stage and [Plaintiff] must

188. See id. (“As this case comes to us on a motion for summary judgment,
after the parties have engaged in substantial discovery, a complete lack of
evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—will not allow a party to survive a
motion for summary judgment.”).
189. Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL 4990629
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017).
190. See id. at *2–5 (describing the three alleged instances of sexual
misconduct and the investigation and hearings that followed).
191. For a discussion of the plaintiff’s other claims under New York state law,
including theories of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and equitable estoppel, see id. at *18–25.
192. See id. at *11 (describing the requirements for an erroneous outcome
claim under Yusuf and Columbia).
193. Id.
194. See id. at *14–18 (addressing and rejecting each of plaintiff’s allegations).
195. See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
sources the plaintiff pointed to as examples of influences on the disciplinary
process).
196. Colgate, 2017 WL 4990629, at *12.
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demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, not merely
allegations of a plausible inference of gender bias.”197
First, the plaintiff pointed to student activism on campus,
including the 2014 Sexual Climate Forum,198 and general survivor
support on campus, including a student group called “Breaking the
Silence.”199 The court found no evidence of bias against men due to
either example of student activism. Next, the plaintiff pointed to
the 2011 DCL as pressure on the University to erroneously
discipline men, but the court explained that “Colgate’s effort to
comply with the 2011 DCL, standing alone, is not evidence of
gender bias.”200 The plaintiff cited university officials’ statements
regarding sexual assault to demonstrate pressure put on the
hearing panel, but the court was again unconvinced.201 Overall, the
court did not find the plaintiff’s evidence sufficient “to permit a
reasonable jury to find that Colgate faced pressure that caused
gender bias to infect” the plaintiff’s hearing.202 The court observed
that all the alleged procedural flaws to which the plaintiff pointed
were “a combination of unsubstantiated assertions based on
plaintiff’s subjective impressions at the hearing,” and accordingly
the court granted the University’s motion for summary
judgment.203

197. Id. (quoting Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., No. 15-cv-10790, 2016 WL
5799297, at *25 n.7) (alteration in original).
198. See id. (observing that plaintiff’s statements revolving around the forum
and statements made in relation to the forum and its speaker often
mischaracterize the record).
199. See id. (“[T]he only evidence regarding Breaking the Silence suggests
that it sought to raise awareness of sexual assault at Colgate, making no
distinction between male and female victims . . . . [R]aising awareness of sexual
assault, without drawing gendered assumptions about males, does not raise an
inference of anti-male bias.”).
200. Id. at *13.
201. See id. (stating that one official’s indication to parents that the
University had expelled students found responsible for sexual misconduct did not
indicate a promise of future punishment and that another official’s statements
regarding “a world without rape” did not demonstrate an impact on the University
or pressure on its administrators).
202. Id.
203. Id. at *17.
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2. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has seen more of these reverse Title IX cases
than other circuits to date.204 The Sixth Circuit reviewed a grant
of summary judgment of a student’s federal claim for sexual
discrimination under Title IX in Mallory v. Ohio University.205 The
plaintiff was a male student who was found culpable and expelled
by the University for sexual misconduct after an incident involving
his sexual encounter with a female student.206 Along with state law
defamation claims against witnesses in the proceedings,207 the
plaintiff alleged that the University discriminated against him
under Title IX “by initiating a disciplinary proceeding against him
and concluding that he committed sexual assault under the
University’s code of student conduct.”208
Because the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit had not “set
forth a standard for determining when intentional discrimination
has occurred in a case where a student has relied on Title IX to
challenge either the initiation or the outcome of the disciplinary
proceeding,” the court followed the analytical framework provided
in Yusuf.209 Under the Yusuf framework, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s determination that the plaintiff had “failed to
present a genuine issue of material fact regarding his selective

204. See generally Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Miami
Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x 437, 452
(6th Cir. 2016).
205. 76 Fed. App’x 634 (6th Cir. 2003).
206. See id. at 636–37 (describing the situation leading to the plaintiff’s
expulsion, as well as a charge of felony battery, in which several people witnessed
the plaintiff engaging in sexual activity with a severely intoxicated female while
the plaintiff had also been consuming alcohol).
207. See id. at 637 (summarizing plaintiff’s claims against several students
for statements they made in connection with the incident but noting that the court
dismissed the claims for various reasons and plaintiff was not appealing these
dismissals).
208. See id. at 636–37 (noting that the University board’s rationale for the
plaintiff’s guilt came from the victim’s significant impairment, preventing her
from being able to engage in consensual contact with the plaintiff).
209. See id. at 638 (explaining that the Second Circuit in Yusuf analogized
Title IX claims to Title VII law and required a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
University’s conduct was motivated by sexual bias).
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enforcement claims under Title IX under either an erroneous
result or selective enforcement theory.”210
Under the plaintiff’s claim for erroneous outcome,211 he argued
that the University had improper focus in the investigation,
leading to an incorrect result.212 The plaintiff claimed that the
University’s focus revealed that it held “an antiquated notion that
‘men are sexual aggressors and women are victims,’”213 but the
court concluded that “the University’s decision to focus on the
ability to consent merely demonstrates the University’s policy
decision to punish those who engage in sexual conduct with
another person when the first person is aware of the other’s
inability to consent.”214 Finally, the plaintiff pointed to
discrimination against him as evidenced by the allegedly
prejudicial procedures which resulted in the erroneous outcome.215
The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a pattern
of biased decision-making by the University or by a university
official with allegedly biased views.216
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument for selective
enforcement,217 which was based on another allegation of archaic
210. See id. at 642 (confirming that the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of the University).
211. See id. (describing the plaintiff’s argument under erroneous outcome as
attempting to point to prejudicial deficiencies in the proceedings).
212. See id. at 639 (explaining the plaintiff’s argument that “the hearing
panel’s focus upon whether [the victim] was able to consent supports finding an
erroneous outcome here because the University’s definition of sexual assault does
not extend to situations where the offender merely knows that the other person’s
ability to consent is impaired”).
213. Id.
214. See id. (stating that even if the University erroneously interpreted the
Student’s Code’s language regarding consent, the plaintiff presented “no evidence
that this interpretation was discriminatorily applied or motivated by a
chauvinistic view of the sexes”).
215. See id. (enumerating plaintiff’s claims regarding his lack of legal counsel,
the process for cross-examination, and the scheduling of the hearing during the
pendency of criminal charges against him).
216. See id. at 639–40 (referencing the plaintiff’s reliance on a previous
complaint against the university official but stating that without evidence of other
students accused of and disciplined for sexual assault and without indication that
the official attempted to wrongfully steer the result, there was no genuine issue
of material fact).
217. See id. at 640 (“The focal point of this argument is that the incident
report equally implicated both him and [the victim] because they were both
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assumptions by the University about the identity of the
aggressor.218 The court found that the plaintiff could not
demonstrate that the female victim was in a sufficiently similar
situation because he ignored critical facts of the incident which
differentiated the two.219 Accordingly, the court decided that the
plaintiff failed to point to a sufficiently similarly-situated female
and had not presented a genuine issue of material fact under the
selective enforcement claim.220 Finally, the court found no support
for the plaintiff’s argument on appeal regarding the University’s
deliberate indifference.221 Overall, the court held that the plaintiff
had not “presented a genuine issue of material fact with regard to
whether the University, in its initiation and prosecution of the
disciplinary action, excluded [him] because of his sex”222 and
granted the University’s motion for summary judgment.
3. Title IX and McDonnell Douglas
In 1996, the Eastern District of Virginia evaluated a Title IX
suit against a university at the summary judgment stage and
applied the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework in
Haley v. Virginia Commonwealth University.223 The case’s facts
differed from cases previously discussed in a few respects,224 but
intoxicated while having sex. These circumstances, [plaintiff] argues, presented
a fair question about ‘who assaulted whom.’”).
218. See id. (pointing to the plaintiff’s argument that the University possessed
an attitude that men could not be violated).
219. See id. at 640–41 (explaining that the plaintiff’s argument ignores the
fact that he was sufficiently more aware than the victim, “which was not based
on the different sexes of the individuals . . . and does nothing to establish that the
University’s initiation of an investigation against Mallory was motivated by sex”).
220. See id. at 641 (distinguishing the plaintiff’s evidence regarding an
affidavit in a previous case and affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the selective enforcement claim).
221. Regarding the deliberate indifference argument, as well as plaintiff’s
argument for an archaic-assumptions standard, the court explains that the
plaintiff asks the court on appeal to read the standards into the Yusuf framework,
but the court does not elaborate further on plaintiff’s specific allegations under
those theories. Id. at 638.
222. Id.
223. 948 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1996).
224. See id. at 575–76 (discussing at length the underlying facts between the
male plaintiff, a graduate student and employee of the University, and the female
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the claim under the Title IX claim of gender bias fell under the
Yusuf framework.225 The court determined that despite the
plaintiff properly setting forth a claim for relief under Title IX, “the
pleadings, affidavits, transcripts, and other evidence” showed that
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the Title IX claim
and granted the University judgment as a matter of law.226
The court stated that “the substantive elements of a federal
discrimination claim are (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, (2) that the plaintiff suffered an unfavorable
action, and (3) that but for the plaintiff’s membership in the
protected class, the adverse action would not have been made.”227
The third element “requires proof of discriminatory intent.”228 The
court determined that the record established no direct or indirect
evidence of a discriminatory intent229 and that there was also not
sufficient evidence to create a presumption of such an intent under
the McDonnell Douglas framework.230 The court explained that,
while courts must necessarily alter the exact terms of McDonnell
Douglas outside of the hiring context, “the basic requirement
remains the same: the plaintiff, in order to create a presumption
of illegal discrimination and shift the burden to the defendant,
must show that he has been treated differently from
similarly-situated people outside of the protected class.”231
The court summarized the Fourth Circuit’s adaption of the
McDonnell Douglas framework in two analogous cases—Lovelace
complainant, a fellow student and employee, who accused him of sexual
harassment, after which he was excluded from the school for two years).
225. See id. at 578 (citing Yusuf as instructive because Title IX, which
prohibits sex discrimination in education, has been interpreted by looking at Title
VI and VII case law).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. (stating that the plaintiff seemed to have “a fundamental
misunderstanding of what it takes to prove a discrimination claim” because his
allegations “at best reflect[ed] a bias against people accused of sexual harassment
and in favor of victims and indicate[d] nothing about gender discrimination”).
230. See id. at 579 (“In discrimination cases analogous to [plaintiff’s], where
there is no direct proof of an illegal bias, the plaintiff can still survive a properly
instituted motion for summary judgment by taking advantage of the McDonnell
scheme of burdens and rebuttable presumptions.”).
231. Id. at 580.
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v. Sherwin-Williams Co.232 and Moore v. City of Charlotte233—and
analyzed the plaintiff’s claim under each.234 In Lovelace, the court
adapted the framework to a case alleging discriminatory discharge
from employment, allowing the plaintiff to “shift the initial burden
by showing that he was performing at a level that met employer’s
legitimate expectations and that the employer sought someone else
to do the same work.”235 The Haley court described the plaintiff’s
first option for classification of his allegations under McDonnell
Douglas as an allegation under Lovelace that it was
“discriminatory to separate him from the school.”236 The Haley
court determined this claim would fail for two reasons. First,
because the plaintiff was found to have harassed the female
complainant, he would not be able to “show that he was performing
at a level that met his employer’s or his educational institution’s
legitimate expectations, and thus cannot shift the burden to [the
University] to adduce a non-discriminatory reason for his
separation from the university.”237 Even if the plaintiff could shift
the burden, the court determined that the University produced a
non-discriminatory rationale for its suspension of the
plaintiff—his sexual harassment of the accuser—and he had not
demonstrated this rationale was pretextual.238 The court reasoned
that while “the plaintiff need not present new evidence at this
stage of the analysis, the evidence presented” by the plaintiff did
“not meet the heightened level of specificity called for by
Lovelace.”239
The Haley court next explored the Moore adaptation of the
burden shifting scheme in a claim alleging race discrimination in

232. 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982).
233. 754 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1985).
234. See Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 580 (E.D. Va.
1996) (“In the case at bar, there are two ways to frame Haley’s allegations, but
neither suffices under the McDonnell scheme as adapted in analogous cases.”).
235. Id. (citing Lovelace, 681 F.2d at 239).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. (explaining that the University’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
rationale would shift the burden, and the plaintiff “had adduced no evidence
whatsoever” that the rationale was pretextual).
239. Id.
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the enforcement of employee disciplinary measures.240 In Moore,
the plaintiff “could create the presumption of discriminatory intent
through a showing that the prohibited conduct he engaged in was
similar to that engaged in by employees outside of the protected
class and that he received more severe disciplinary measures than
those others.”241 The Haley court explained that the plaintiff’s
claim could be viewed under Moore as an allegation that he was
discriminated against in the way the disciplinary proceedings were
held, making his initial burden that of showing female students
accused of similarly prohibited conduct were disciplined less
severely.242 This allegation, however, did not survive summary
judgment because all of the plaintiff’s evidence pertained only to
his own proceedings with no evidence about how other students
similarly accused were treated by the University.243 In conclusion,
the court held that the plaintiff could not set forth a prima facie
case of sexual discrimination, or in the alternative, demonstrate
that the University’s reasons for its disciplinary action were
pretextual, making summary judgment for the University
appropriate.244
Few other cases have reached the summary judgment stage in
reverse Title IX claims,245 making the future of the claims unclear.

240. Id.
241. Id. (referencing Moore, 754 F.2d at 1105–06); see also Evans v. Techs.
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework to a claim of gender discrimination in employer’s
promotion of employees).
242. See Haley, 948 F. Supp. at 580–81 (explaining that this allegation could
also be supported “by data showing that women rarely, if ever, are accused of
sexual harassment, coupled perhaps with evidence that women accused of other
[university] rules violations are treated differently than men are”).
243. See id. at 581 (noting that the plaintiff presented “absolutely no evidence
about how other students are treated” in the University’s disciplinary
proceedings).
244. See id. at 583 (“[T]he record establishes that there is no direct or indirect
evidence or [sic] discriminatory intent, nor is there sufficient evidence to establish
a presumption of such intent under the McDonnell framework and its various
adaptations.”).
245. See, e.g., Bleiler v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, No. CIV.A. 11-11541-DJC,
2013 WL 4714340, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding that the male student
had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the college acted
with gender bias in its proceedings because no reasonable jury could find that the
College’s code of conduct was gender biased).
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V. Argument
The rival interests involved in campus sexual misconduct
cases are evidenced in the polarized debate that surrounds the
issue. Despite some similarities shared on each side of the
conversation, the differences rule the day.246 The conflicting
guidance put forth by the Department of Education in recent years
verifies the opposing priorities of the competing factions—while
the Obama administration, specifically through the 2011 DCL,
generally sought to strengthen victim protections,247 the Trump
administration’s 2017 DCL and subsequent proposed regulations
highlight the importance of protections for the accused students.248
This tension seems unlikely to resolve itself in the near future,
increasing the chances that the types of claims discussed will
continue to increase in frequency. Unfortunately, “[l]ower courts
appear divided in whether allegations of a reverse gender backlash
from the 2011 DCL and DOE’s enforcement thereof are sufficient,
standing alone, to plead Title IX gender bias.”249
The courts need to provide clarity regarding their acceptance
of both federal and public pressure as evidence supporting an
inference of gender bias. As more cases are surviving motions to
dismiss, inevitably the amount of cases reaching the summary
judgment stage will increase as well. Therefore, it is necessary to
establish a consistent and clear framework for evaluating a
plaintiff’s evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists.

246. See Brodsky, supra note 6, at 827–31 (exploring the shared values
between the warring interests and asserting that “the long-term realization of
accused and victimized students’ interests depends on the perceived legitimacy of
disciplinary procedures for gender violence”).
247. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41 (emphasizing that “schools should ensure
that steps taken to accord due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not
restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections for the complainant”).
248. See 2017 Press Release, supra note 43 (announcing the end of “the era of
rule by letter,” which “created a system that lacked basic elements of due process
and failed to ensure fundamental fairness”).
249. Neal v. Colo. St. Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-cv-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045,
at *11 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2017).
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A. Limiting Courts’ Consideration of Pressure on Universities
It is common for reverse Title IX plaintiffs to cite pressure on
universities as evidence of an incentive for the universities to be
biased against them, and many plaintiffs cite Columbia as support
for the assertion that public criticism of universities can be used to
plead a reverse Title IX claim.250 However, Columbia should be
narrowly limited to its particular set of facts, including
particularized allegations against individual university officials in
connection with the proceedings.251 Columbia does not support the
broad assertion that pressure to address sexual assault indicates
gender bias; at most, such criticism supports the proposition that
universities are persuaded to favor victims.252 Without
significantly more evidence of motivation by gender bias, courts
should not give weight to pressure on universities as support for
discriminatory intent—at most the combination of federal pressure
and public criticism should provide a backdrop against which to
assess the allegations of gender bias.253
Furthermore, pressure is being put on universities from both
sides, as evidenced by the intensely debated issues surrounding
campus sexual assault policies. The public pressure by students
and advocates must be considered in the overall context of the
campus sexual assault debate, which includes arguments by critics
concerned that “women will ‘cry rape’ and men will be unfairly
250. See, e.g., Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069 (LEK/DEP), 2017 WL
4990629 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017) (analyzing a plaintiff’s claim using the 2011
DCL and Columbia for evidence that the University had pressure to be biased
against him).
251. See supra notes 145–153 and accompanying text (enumerating the
plaintiff’s many examples of bias by individuals involved in the plaintiff’s
investigation and hearing). The court in Columbia stated that the “alleged biased
attitudes were, at least in part, adopted to refute criticisms circulating in the
student body and in the public press that Columbia was turning a blind eye to
female students’ charges of sexual assault by male students.” Doe v. Columbia
Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 1996).
252. See, e.g., Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1226 (D. Or. 2016)
(refusing “to extend [Columbia’s] reasoning because Plaintiffs make no similar
allegations of an atmosphere of scrutiny, and even had they done so, there
remains no plausible inference that a university’s aggressive response to
allegations of sexual misconduct is evidence of gender discrimination”).
253. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (utilizing the
“backdrop” strategy to analyze the plaintiff’s claim).
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punished.”254 There are many “loud[] voices decrying the treatment
of students accused of gender violence” who “appear deeply
unconcerned with victims’ educations” and have “rooted their
campaign in misogyny and misinformation about sexual
assault.”255 Some scholars argue that “[f]iling suit under Title IX is
a political declaration that male rights matter . . . .”256 Therefore,
courts should examine the overall public pressure put on
universities as a broader backdrop against which to assess
allegations of gender discrimination.
B. Policies and Purposes of Title IX
A large majority of the claims being brought under reverse
Title IX theories are essentially at odds with the purposes of Title
IX and of the sex discrimination theories of liability. Broadly
speaking, university Title IX policies aim to increase awareness of
sexual assault, protect the victims of such conduct, and adequately
address such issues.257 It is an unreasonable inference that by
creating and acting under policies with such goals, a university is
biased against men or individual plaintiffs. The purpose of Title IX
was not only to prevent federal funding from supporting
discriminatory practices based on gender but also to provide
individual protection to citizens against such discrimination.258
Allowing federal pressure on universities to support a claim of
reverse Title IX gender discrimination is contrary to the
underlying explanations of the causes of action pursued. The
concepts of deliberate indifference, hostile environment,
254. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 368 (arguing that these critics should
not minimize the aftereffects for women alleging sexual assault, including PTSD
and emotional fallout from the assault itself).
255. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 826.
256. Corbin, supra note 4, at 2669.
257. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 362 (“The three main responsibilities of
a school are best described as prevention, response, and resolution of matters
involving sexual misconduct.”).
258. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text; see also Dana Bolger,
Betsy DeVos’s New Harassment Rules Protect Schools, Not Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2018, at A27 (“We have federal civil rights law like Title IX for a reason.
Fifty years ago, schools were allowed to impose all sorts of sexist restrictions on
girls’ ability to learn. . . . We passed Title IX to end that.”).
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archaic-assumptions, selective enforcement, and erroneous
outcome are based upon the terminology that essentially serves as
the justification for federal pressure upon universities. However,
through the 2011 DCL, the Obama administration sought to
remove hostility from campus environments, reduce deliberate
indifference by universities, eradicate archaic assumptions about
gender dynamics in sexual assault scenarios, prevent selective
enforcement of university disciplinary policies, and avoid erroneous
outcomes in their disciplinary proceedings.259
Generally, courts have been correctly rejecting claims under
several theories of reverse Title IX claims, including
hostile-environment,260
deliberate
indifference,261
and
archaic-assumptions.262 These claims should be limited to
situations in which a plaintiff has experienced harassing conduct
outside of the Title IX disciplinary proceedings against him.
The 2011 DCL repeatedly refers to Title IX’s protections in the
context of addressing situations that create a “hostile
environment” for students.263 These frequent references to Title
IX’s attempts at elimination or alleviation of hostile environments
demonstrate the underlying purpose of the federal guidance to (or
pressure on) universities—to ensure that all students feel safe in
their schools and can fully benefit from their educational
experiences.264 Therefore, it is appropriate for courts to limit the
259. See generally 2011 DCL, supra note 41 (providing significant guidance
as to the purposes of the federal instructions).
260. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text (specifying the
heightened severity of behavior that must exist to create a hostile environment).
261. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text (explaining that the
sexual harassment underlying a deliberate indifference claim must consist of
more than only sex discrimination in disciplinary proceedings).
262. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text (limiting the application
of the archaic-assumptions theory to sex discrimination in athletics).
263. See 2011 DCL, supra note 41, at 3 (explaining that a “single or isolated
incident of sexual harassment may create a hostile environment if the incident is
sufficiently severe”); id. at 4 (“If a school knows or reasonably should know about
student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment, Title IX
requires the school to take immediate action to eliminate the harassment, prevent
its recurrence, and address its effects.”); id. at 5–6 (stating that adopting the
suggested policies could “bring potentially problematic conduct to the school’s
attention before it becomes serious enough to create a hostile environment”).
264. See id. at 2 (“The Department is deeply concerned about this problem
and is committed to ensuring that all students feel safe in their school . . . .”).
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application of the hostile-environment theory to sexual
harassment significantly above and beyond alleged discrimination
in disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, most courts have not
allowed deliberate indifference claims to challenge allegedly unfair
disciplinary proceedings without a showing of the more classic
situations of sexual harassment.265 Finally, courts have also
correctly refused to apply an archaic-assumptions theory to the
reverse Title IX claims.266 Expansion of these three theories to sex
discrimination experienced in university disciplinary action is
inapposite to the actual concepts behind the theories of liability.
C. Maintaining a High Discriminatory Intent Burden
Similar to the employment discrimination legal landscape
that existed when the Court decided McDonnell Douglas, the
reverse Title IX discrimination jurisprudence demonstrates a
“notable lack of harmony.”267 As more reverse Title IX claims reach
the summary judgment stage, it is possible the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting framework will play a more significant role in
plaintiffs’ attempts to support their claims of discriminatory
intent.268 Theoretically, the frameworks laid out by the court in
Haley269 can be applied to selective enforcement and erroneous
outcome claims. However, the application should be strictly
limited.
While most selective enforcement theories have yet to succeed
under reverse Title IX claims, courts have entertained the idea
that such a claim is viable if the plaintiff student produced more

265. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining
that deliberate indifference must rise to the level of sexual harassment and that
one incident of non-consensual kissing was not enough to meet that standard).
Thus far, Wells v. Xavier University, 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 751–52 (S.D. Ohio 2014),
seems to be the only case in which a court explicitly allowed a deliberate
indifference claim under reverse Title IX to proceed without a clear showing of
sexual harassment.
266. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
267. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
268. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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evidence supporting the theory.270 The Moore271 adaptation of the
McDonnell Douglas framework has many similarities to the
selective enforcement theory under Title IX. Under the Moore
burden shifting framework, the plaintiff can establish a
presumption of bias by demonstrating that the prohibited conduct
in which he engaged was similar to that engaged in by students
outside of his protected class (females) and that he received more
severe disciplinary measures than those others.272 If the plaintiff
can establish that females at his school were engaged in similar
conduct to that of which he was accused and disciplined without
receiving disciplinary action themselves, this would create a
temporary presumption of discriminatory intent.273
An erroneous outcome claim is somewhat analogous to the
Haley court’s other adaptation of McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting, which fell under the Lovelace framework.274 The Lovelace
adaptation allows the plaintiff to allege that he was
discriminatorily separated from his university and shift the initial
burden “by showing that he was performing at a level that met the
employer’s legitimate expectations and that the employer sought
someone else to do the same work.”275 The underlying rationale
behind the erroneous outcome theory is that the plaintiff is
“innocent and wrongly found to have committed an offense,”276
which could be used to demonstrate that the student was
performing at a level that met his university’s legitimate

270. See supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text (citing cases in which
courts have analyzed claims under the selective enforcement theory before
dismissing due to insufficient allegations).
271. See supra notes 240–244 and accompanying text (evaluating the claim in
Haley under Moore’s framework for discriminatory employee discipline).
272. See Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105–06 (4th Cir. 1993)
(applying the burden-shifting framework).
273. But see Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL 5659821, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2017) (denying a male plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim
alleging that he and his female accuser were similarly-situated because she was
disciplined for sexual harassment while he was accused of sexually harassing and
stalking her).
274. See supra notes 235–239 and accompanying text.
275. Haley v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 580 (E.D. Va.
1996).
276. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
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expectations of him. It is possible courts could apply this theory to
create a temporary presumption of discriminatory intent.
However, even if plaintiffs successfully establish a
presumption of gender bias under the discriminatory intent
framework, the burden would shift to the university, allowing it
the opportunity to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for taking disciplinary action against the plaintiff.277 Because the
plaintiff in an erroneous outcome theory will have been found to
have committed the underlying offense, this burden will be easy
for universities to meet.278 If reverse Title IX claims make it to this
stage of burden shifting, courts should apply a high standard in
allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate that the
university’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was a cover-up for
gender discrimination. If the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
framework is further applied to reverse Title IX claims in the
future, plaintiffs must be required to meet a heightened level of
specificity.
VI. Conclusion
Every year, more and more reverse Title IX claims are being
brought by accused students against universities. The reverse
discrimination causes of action under Title IX have become widely
recognized by federal courts. In many circuits, accused students
are having some success in using the modern conversation
surrounding campus sexual assault to create a plausible inference
of gender bias against them during their disciplinary proceedings.
In essence, reverse Title IX plaintiffs are using the statute to
impair the universities’ ability to provide students protections
under the statute, which is not what Congress intended under Title
IX.279 The policies and purposes behind Title IX strongly encourage
restraint by the courts in accepting some types of reverse Title IX
277. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03 (explaining that it is not
necessary for the court to attempt “to detail every matter which fairly could be
recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire”).
278. See, e.g., Haley, 948 F. Supp. at 580.
279. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (“We do not believe that Congress meant Title
IX to impair the independence of universities in disciplining students against
whom the evidence of an offense, after a fair hearing, is overwhelming, absent a
claim of selective enforcement.”).
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claims going forward. Aside from consistency and clarity in judicial
resolution of these claims, an essential aspect going forward
centers around schools’ abilities to create and consistently follow
clear guidance in these procedures. When looking at the big picture
and “to the larger political landscape, the long-term realization of
accused and victimized students’ interests depends on the
perceived legitimacy of disciplinary procedures for gender
violence.”280
The conversation surrounding campus sexual assault is as
pertinent and present as ever, as further evidenced by the
enormous amount of comments in response to the Trump
administration’s proposed regulations.281 Among other things, the
proposed regulations would institute an actual knowledge
requirement for universities instead of a constructive knowledge
requirement, which would raise the standard for holding
universities accountable under deliberate indifference, raise the
standard of evidence for sexual violence claims, making them more
difficult to prove, and release universities from liability for
off-campus incidents between students.282
It is unclear exactly what impact these regulations would have
on reverse Title IX claims, especially those blaming federal
pressure for their universities’ alleged discrimination against
them. Because of the uncertainty going forward, as well as the
continuing intensity between competing factions, clarity among
the courts and consistency within universities are the best ways to
ensure fair proceedings. Courts need to provide precision in the
evaluation of reverse Title IX claims and should consider the
purposes and policies of Title IX in future analyses of such claims.
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